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A Primer on Criminal Child Abuse and
Neglect Law
By Douglas E. Abrams
ABSTRACT
This article surveys major aspects of criminal child abuse and neglect law
encountered by judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers, child advocates, and child
care professionals. The author, whose casebook, Children and the Law: Doctrine, Policy
and Practice (West 4th ed. 2010) (with Sarah H. Ramsey), is required reading in law
schools throughout the United States, analyzes both constitutional and statutory law.
THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The Roles of Constitutional and Statutory Enforcement
In 2010, the Juvenile and Family Court Journal published my article, A Primer on
Child Abuse and Neglect Law.' Civil and criminal maltreatment law are intimately related
because much conduct that would support a civil abuse or neglect petition would also
support a criminal prosecution. Child maltreatment cases may be referred to law enforce-
ment authorities by child protective agencies, families, victims, physicians, schools, and
other persons. State abuse and neglect reporting acts typically require child protective
agencies to share reports with law enforcement.
"One of the principal tasks of law-enforcement personnel is the investigation of
reports of child abuse. Most departments have specially assigned investigators for child
abuse cases and these persons are either on duty or on call twenty-four hours a day."2 The
1 61 JUV. AND FAM. CT. J. 1 (Winter 2010) (with Sarah H. Ramsey).
2 WILLIAM G. BAILEY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 66 (1995).
Douglas E. Abrams, JD, is a law professor at the University of Missouri, where he teaches children
and the law and family law. He has served as an Associate Editor of the Juvenile and Family CourtJournal since
1993. Correspondence: abramsd(d-missouri.edu
Editor's Note: This article is adapted from Chapter 5 of Children and the Law in a Nutshell, by Sarah
H. Ramsey and Douglas E. Abrams (4th ed. 2011), published by West Academic. (To purchase a copy, call
888-728-7677 or visit legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com. If you are a professor considering this text for
adoption and would like to receive a complimentary copy, call 800-313-WEST (9378) or e-mail
westacademic@thomsonreuters.com. Reprinted by permission.
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task is no small matter because acts of child abuse committed by parents and other
caretakers comprise about one-fifth of violent crimes against all children, and more than
one-half of crimes against children two or younger, that are reported to police.'
In child maltreatment cases, the goals of civil and criminal intervention are related
yet distinct. Civil intervention seeks to protect the child by treating the child and family
and, when necessary, removing temporary or permanent custody. Criminal enforcement
seeks to protect the child by prosecuting offenders. Civil proceedings focus primarily on
the condition of the child and family; criminal prosecutions focus primarily on the
defendant's guilt or innocence.
Ideally child protective agencies and law enforcement cooperate to fashion a coor-
dinated response about whether to move against particular acts of maltreatment civilly,
criminally or both. The decision may balance several factors, including these:
The seriousness of the alleged uonduct. Serious injury to the child may be prosecuted, but one
slapping incident might not be.
The perpetrator's evident state of mind. Prosecution may be more likely if the perpetrator acted
wantonly, than if the maltreatment smacked of immaturity or frustration, or of not knowing
how to raise a child.
The perpetrator's amenability to treatment. Prosecution may be more likely if the perpetrator
resists treatment or if civil authorities have previously tried treatment to no avail, but less
likely if the perpetrator appears willing and perhaps able to respond to treatment.
The strength of the proof The criminal burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt; the civil
burden is lower, either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.
The burden may be particularly important in sexual abuse cases, where the child victim
(often the only eyewitness other than the perpetrator) may be unwilling or unable to testify,
or may be ineffective on the stand.
Community outrage. If the abuse or neglect is publicized and outrages the community,
prosecution is more likely, perhaps partly for deterrent effect. Publicized acts are also likely
to be relatively serious, thus relating to the first factor listed above.
Thc remedy's likely effect on the child and janly. Would branding a parent with a criminal
record further hurt the family. If the parent has other children, should the parent be
incarcerated? If authorities do not seek incarceration or termination of parental rights,
would the child and family be better off if the parent is treated civilly? Would civil remedies
(such as temporary loss of custody or termination of parental rights) better protect the child,
and impose greater punishment on the parent, than a prison sentence?
Predictions of future abuse or neglect. Even if the abuse or neglect does not appear particularly
serious now, authorities may invoke the criminal process to deter the perpetrator before the
conduct escalates and threatens death or serious injury to the child.
Parallel Proceedings
Child protective agencies and the prosecutor may employ both the civil system's
protective function and the criminal justice system's punitive function arising from the
same incident of maltreatment. In People v. Moreno, for example, the Illinois juvenile court
dismissed the civil abuse petition because the state had not shown that the child's injuries
3 David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Child Ab,e Reported to the Police (OJJDP 2001).
4 E.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Combatting Child Abuse: Guidelines for Cooperation Between Law Enforce-
ment and Child Protective Agencies, 24 FA. L.Q. 209 (1990).
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were other than accidental.5 Because civil and criminal child abuse proceedings have
different purposes, however, the court then denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the
criminal prosecution for aggravated battery of a child. "In the juvenile proceeding, the
ultimate litigated issue was whether the minor children of defendant were abused . .; in
the subsequent criminal proceeding, the ultimate litigated issue will be whether the
defendant is criminally culpable for the injuries to [the child]."6
Because a juvenile court abuse or neglect proceeding is civil, a later criminal
prosecution charging the underlying acts also does not constitute double jeopardy in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, which applies only in cases of two or more criminal
prosecutions.
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CHILD ENDANGERMENT
Overview
A number of criminal statutes may be invoked against persons who inflict physical,
sexual, or emotional maltreatment on children. Some of these statutes (such as ones
proscribing murder, manslaughter, or assault) apply when the victim is any person or
"another person," and thus permit prosecution when the victim happens to be a child.
Complementing these general-application crimes are crimes applicable only when
the victim is a child. These child-specific crimes carry a variety of names, such as
endangering the welfare of a child, child abuse, criminal neglect, or cruelty to children.
The typical endangerment statute permits conviction for a wide range of conduct harmful
to children.' Pennsylvania's child endangerment statute, for example, operates against
"[a] parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child" who "knowingly
endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection, or support."9
With somewhat greater specificity, Florida's criminal child abuse statute operates against
"[a} person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child.""o
As the Pennsylvania and Florida statutes indicate, the child-specific statutes typi-
cally extend beyond defendants who have legal custody or control of the child, sometimes
to persons such as teachers or day care workers." The defendant class, however is not
5 74 N.E.2d 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
6 Id. at 912.
7 People v. Roselle, 643 N.E.2d 72 (N.Y 1994); U.S. Const. amend. V ("nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
8 E.g.. Hughes v. State, 910 P.2d 254 (Nev. 1996) (transporting a child in a stolen vehicle); People
V. Suquisupa, 637 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (selling fireworks to unsupervised 13-year-old who suffered
a serious hand injury from a premature explosion); State v. Marschat, 1991 WIL 12812 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(leaving 6-year-old son in the car for approximately two hours in August with all the windows rolled up; son
died from the heat).
9 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4304.
10 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 827.03.
11 E.g., State v. Pasteur, 9 S.W 3d 689 (Mo Ct. App. 1999) (teacher); People v. Simmons, 699
N.E.2d 417 (N.Y 1998) (day care worker).
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unlimited. In State v, Leckington, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the
endangerment conviction of an adult who was merely a passenger in a car that transported
an intoxicated 13-year-old.12
Where the child-specific statute operates against "any person, or against "whoever"
engaged in the proscribed conduct, the defendant class may even include a child,
including a child younger than the victim. In K.B.S. v. State, for example, the Florida
appellate court affirmed the delinquency adjudication against a 14-year-old for abusing
a nine-year-old by burning him with a cigarette; the court noted that the statute would
also operate against a 9-year-old who abused a 14-year-old."
Children Who Witness Domestic Violence
Children who witness domestic violence inflicted on a parent may suffer
profound adverse effects, including post-traumatic stress disorder and other severe
emotional and behavioral damage. Female child witnesses are more likely later to be
abused as adults, and male child witnesses are more likely later to become abusers as
adults."
In People v. Johnson, the court held that a defendant who committed vicious acts of
domestic violence against his former girlfriend in her children's presence could be
convicted under the state's endangerment statute, which criminalizes "knowingly
act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental, or moral welfare of a
child less than seventeen years old."'5 Some states now specifically criminalize "domestic
violence in the presence of a child," 16 or provide enhanced sentencing where children
witness the attack."
Parental Privilege
As public debate continues concerning the efficacy and propriety of corporal pun-
ishment of children, the criminal law continues to recognize a parental privilege for
reasonable discipline. Section 3.08 of the Model Penal Code, for example, provides that
"[tlhe use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if:
(1) The actor is the parent or guardian or other person similarly responsible for the
general care and supervision of a minor or a person acting at the request of such
parent, guardian, or other responsible person and:
12 713 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 2006).
13 725 So.2d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
14 E.g., Naomi Cahn, Child Witnessing of Domestic Violence, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE,
AND VIOLENCE 3 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006); Lois A.
Weithorn, Protecting Children From Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53
HASTINGs L.J. 1 (2001).
15 740 N.E.2d 1075, 1076 (N.Y 2000).
16 E.g., Idaho Code § 18-918(7)(b).
17 E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.160(3) (class A misdemeanor to class A felony).
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(a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare
of the minor, including the preventing or punishment of his misconduct;
and
(b) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk
of causing death, serious bodily harm, disfigurement, extreme pain, or
mental distress or gross degradation."
The privilege seeks to balance parents' rights to direct their children's upbringing
with the state's parens patriae interest in punishing child maltreatment. As the Model
Penal Code formulation indicates, the privilege extends beyond parents to other care-
takers, though the extension is not boundless. In State v. Dodd, for example, the live-in
boyfriend of the child's mother not privileged because the court found that he was not a
person responsible for the child's welfare."
Abusive Discipline
Criminal charges frequently arise from serious physical or emotional injury inflicted
by parents or other caregivers on children they are seeking to discipline. The precise
number of prosecutions arising from abusive discipline cannot be determined, but the
number is likely significant because studies demonstrate that most of American parents
use physical force to punish their children, and that most abuse is perpetrated by
caregivers. Whatever the relationship, reported decisions include children who are
burned, beaten with belts and bats, locked in closets and deprived of food, and force-fed.
Abusive discipline leads to the child's death with disturbing frequency.O
The parental tort immunity doctrine prohibits unemancipated children from suing
their parents for intentional or negligent torts. At one time, the doctrine sought to
preserve family harmony, prevent fraud and collusion between parent and child, encour-
age support for parental authority, and protect family assets. Almost all states now allow
children to sue their parents for intentional personal injuries, however, and some states
now also permit suits for negligent supervision. In jurisdictions that have abrogated or
restricted parental tort immunity, a child injured by unprivileged corporal punishment
or other physical abuse may maintain a damage action against the parent who inflicted
the abuse.20
Abandonment
Where child endangerment rises to the level of total neglect, a parent or guardian
may face prosecution for abandonment. More than a million children each year run away
from home and live on the streets; many of these children are more aptly labeled
18 518 N.W2d 300, 301 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
19 E.g., Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense-
Reasonable and Nessa). or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 481-82.
20 E.g., Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, -81 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 2001) (intentional sexual abuse); Murray v.
Murray, 623 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (abusive discipline).
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.throwaways" because they are directly told to leave the household, or because no
household member cares whether they return.21 At least with respect to older children,
however, authorities rarely invoke criminal abandonment statutes against throwaways'
parents.
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Most states have statutes criminalizing conduct that might lead a juvenile to
commit delinquent acts. Massachusetts, for example, punishes "[alny person who shall
be found to have caused, induced, abetted, or encouraged or contributed toward the
delinquency of a child, or to have acted in any way tending to cause or induce such
delinquency. "23
As in Massachusetts, a contributing-to-delinquency statute's defendant class typi-
cally includes "any person" who commits the proscribed conduct, a class considerably
broader than the parents and other caregivers reached by the typical endangerment
statute.2 Contributing-to-delinquency statutes are commonly used to punish adults for
providing alcohol or tobacco or engaging in sexual activity." These statutes, however, may
even reach juvenile defendants who contribute to the delinquency of other juveniles.2 6
In most states, a defendant may be convicted of contributing to the delinquency of
a minor even if the minor did not commit a delinquent act, or was never charged or
adjudicated a delinquent. "The defendant is punished for his own acts, not those of the
juvenile."
"Safe Haven" Statutes
The media periodically reports tragic stories of newborns abandoned to die in
dumpsters, trash bins, and similar places.28 The mother is typically a frightened teenager
or young woman who has concealed the pregnancy from family and friends, and who may
even be in clinical denial that she is pregnant. Because many of these frightened mothers
fear identification if they go to hospitals (particularly public hospitals), they may choose
infanticide where the law provides no confidential alternative for surrendering the baby
safely.
21 E.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLIcY
AND PRACTICE 960-63 (4th ed. 2010).
22 Gregory A. Loken, "Thrownauay" Children and Throuauaj Parenthood, 68 TEMP. L REV. 1715
(1995).
23 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 63.
2- E.g., State v. Groce-Hopson, 2004 WL 1252696 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (defendant helped her
friend's child remove items from store without paying for them and load them in her car).
25 E.g., State v. Gilbert, 969 A.2d 125 (Vt. 2009) (defendant approximately 50 years old purchased
alcohol and cigarettes for a minor, attended an underage party with other minors at which there was drinking
and drug use, and then engaged in sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl at the party.
26 E.g., In re Lomeli, 665 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
27 State v. Trevino, 865 P.2d 1172 (N.M. 1993).
28 E.g., Christopher Placek & Josh Stockinger, Preemie Found in Trash Bin, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
Dec. 19, 2012, at 5.
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Nearly all states now have "safe haven" laws, which permit a parent to deliver a
newborn safely to such persons as law enforcement personnel, firefighters, emergency
medical technicians, clergy, or hospital personnel. Depending on the state, the laws
permit safe delivery within a few hours after birth, or within a month or year. The
legislation provides the parent freedom from conviction for child endangerment, aban-
donment, or similar crimes.
These laws have saved some newborns, but so far have generally proved less effective
than their proponents had hoped. Reasons for diminished effectiveness may include
inadequate publicity, practical difficulties inherent in safe haven relinquishment,
mothers lingering doubts about the completeness of promised legal protection, and the
inability of such legislation to reach the frightened targets.
"Void-For-Vagueness" Challenges
Criminal endangerment statutes typically carry broad language designed to
enable authorities to prosecute a wide range of physical and emotional mistreatment
of children. Some questionable conduct, however, cannot fit under even broad
statutory mandates. Where the fit seems difficult to make, constitutional challenge
remains available under the Fourteenth Amendment due process void-for-vagueness
doctrine.
The doctrine requires that a penal statute "define the criminal offense with suffi-
cient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.""o Where
the conduct at issue appears particularly harmful to children and is arguably within the
endangerment statute's proscriptions, courts normally reject vagueness challenges. In
Conanonwealth v. Hendricks, for example, the court rejected the vagueness defense of a
father who, with his three-year-old child in the car, deliberately embarked on a high-
speed nighttime chase to elude the police; reached speeds exceeding twice the speed
limit; traveled over roadways that were narrow, scarred with pot holes, and contained
sharp turns; and drove over an embankment and several hundred yards into woods, where
he fled on foot from pursuing police while he held the child."
Vagueness challenges to endangerment statutes sometimes succeed, however, where
the seriousness of the defendant's conduct seems open to fair question. In City of Las Vegas
i EighthJudicial District Court, the court sustained the vagueness defense of a man who
willfully and unlawfully annoy[ed} a minor . by following [her] from her residence to
another residence, thereafter asking for her ten to fifteen times. "12 The defendant might
have been prosecuted for a crime with more definite elements such as harassment, but not
for endangerment.
29 E.g., Carol Sanger, Infant Saj Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
753 (2006).
30 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
31 891 N.E.2d 209 (Mass. 2008).
32 59 P.3d 477, 479 (Nev. 2002).
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The "Cultural Defense"
Where a person commits acts or omissions that would support prosecution for
endangering the welfare of a child or a similar offense involving abuse or neglect, should
the law excuse guilt or mitigate punishment on the ground that the acts or omissions
reflect the defendant's cultural background that differs from mainstream American
culture? (Similarly, should juvenile courts weigh cultural differences in determining
whether to find a child abused or neglected in civil proceedings?)
The "cultural defense" sometimes arises as the American population grows more
diverse through immigration from nations with a variety of cultural traditions. The
defense raises the question whether a pluralistic society tolerant of individual differences
can (or should) have a culturally relative, rather than an absolute, child protective
standard. Several cultural practices potentially clash with mainstream American views of
child protection, including shaming and unreasonable corporal punishment, sexual rela-
tions with a child below the age of consent, and female circumcision.
American criminal law has refused to recognize a formal cultural defense. Civil
authorities are also wary of the defense, but a few states require child protective authori-
ties to examine cultural differences when determining whether abuse or neglect has
occurred.
SEXUAL ABUSE
What Is Child Sexual Abuse?
According to the American Academy of Pediatrics, "[slexual abuse occurs when a
child is engaged in sexual activities that he or she cannot comprehend, for which he or she
is developmentally unprepared and cannot give consent, and/or that violate the law or
social taboos of society. The sexual activities may include all forms of oral-genital, genital,
or anal contact by or to the child or abuse that does not involve contact, such as
exhibitionism, voyeurism, or using the child in the production of pornography.
Sexual abuse includes a spectrum of activities ranging from rape to physically less
intrusive sexual abuse."33
Because of the attendant shame and embarrassment, sexual abuse is an under-
reported crime among victims of all ages. Data nonetheless indicate that "uinwanted
sexual experiences during adolescence are common, with a large survey of middle- and
high-school students indicating that 18% of females and 12% of males have had an
unwanted experience." 34 [TIwo thirds to three quarters of all adolescent sexual assaults are
perpetrated by an acquaintance or relative of the adolescent. Older adolescents are most
commonly the victims during social encounters with the assailants (e.g., a date). With
33 Am. Academy of Pediatrics, The Evaluation of Sexual Abuse in Children, 116 PEDIATRiCS 506
(2005).
34 Miriam Kaufman et al., Care of the Adolescent Sexual Assault Victim, 122 PEDIATRICS 462, 464
(2008).
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younger adolescent victims, the assailant is more likely to be a member of the adolescent's
extended family."" "Children and adolescents with disabilities are at significantly
increased risk of sexual assault: 1.5 to 2 times higher than the general population."
Representative Statutes
Endangerment, criminal child abuse, and general criminal sexual abuse statutes
often include sexual exploitation of children. Child sexual abuse statutes, however,
operate specifically against such exploitation and ordinarily carry greater penalties.
"Forcible" and "Statutory" Rape
"Forcible rape" statutes depend on proof that the victim submitted to sexual
activity because of the defendant's threat or use of physical compulsion. Forcible rape
statutes generally criminalize conduct against "any person," and thus reach physical
compulsion against children and adults alike.
To be distinguished from forcible rape, "statutory rape" is an offense sometimes
called by such names as indecent liberties with a child, lewd and lascivious activities with
a child, or carnal knowledge of a child. Statutory rape does not include force as an
element. The key element is the victim's age, and the prosecutor may prevail by proving
that the proscribed sexual conduct took place between the defendant and the underage
victim. As a matter of law, the victim is deemed incapable of consent if he or she is below
the statute's specified age (the so-called "age of consent"), or if more than the specified
minimum age differential exists between the victim and the defendant. Purported
consent would not be a defense, regardless of anything the young victim might have said
or indicated to the perpetrator.
Where two competent adults engage in private, consensual sexual activity, their
conduct is an exercise of liberty protected by Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process that statutes thus may not proscribe.3 1 Privacy or other right offers no protection
under the federal or state constitutions, however, when one or both participants in sexual
activity is a child."
The 1996 Welfare Reform Act urged states and local jurisdictions to "aggressively
enforce statutory rape laws."" Congress acted on the assumption that prosecution would
create a climate of deterrence and help control the rate of teenage out-of-wedlock
pregnancies, which has risen dramatically in the past two decades. In 2011, 40.7% of
U.S. births were to unwed mothers, a substantial number of whom were teenagers. Most
35 Id. at 462-63.
i6 Id. at 463.
37 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
38 E.g., Ferris v. Santa Clara County, 891 F.2d 715 (9th Cit. 1989) (federal Constitution); In re C.P,
555 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 2001) (state constitution).
;9 42 U.S.C. § 14016.
40 Brady E. Hamilton et al., Annual Summary of Vital Statistics: 2010-2011, 131 PEDIATRIcs 548
(2013).
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out-of-wedlock teenage pregnancies result from conduct of older men that is chargeable
as statutory rape or another sex crime.
Illcest
Where a person engages in sexual activity with a son, daughter, sibling, or other
family member, the person may face prosecution for incest. Incest statutes reach blood
relationships, but are not uniform in their treatment of non-blood relationships (such as
step or adoptive relationships). Section 230.2 of the Model Penal Code, for example,
would criminalize sexual relations between adoptive parents and their adoptive chil-
dren, but not between other family members related by adoption or between step
relations. Where the step or adoptive relationship between defendant and victim is
outside the incest statute, the defendant would remain subject to prosecution for other
sex crimes if the victim is under the age of consent. Incest perpetrated by children on
siblings appears to be quite prevalent, though it is often under-reported, largely because
parents may resist reporting that one of their children has sexually abused another in
the home.'
Sexual Enticement of Children on the Internet
"Today's teenagers spend an average of 11.6 hours a week using the Internet-more
time than they spend watching television (9.8 hours per week) . and doing homework
(8.9 hours per week)."4 Widespread Internet use raises serious child protection issues.
"[Miolesters, who were once ostracized and limited in their ability to nurture relation-
ships with minors due to the lack of opportunities to communicate freely with them in
unsupervised settings, now develop relationships based on daily contact with children
over the Internet. Within months, sometimes even weeks, these molesters are able to
nurture the relationship to a point where the molester can travel to see the minor or
arrange for the minor to travel to the molester."
In a nationally representative survey of regular 10-17-year-old Internet users in
2005, researchers found (1) that about 13% of youth Internet users had received a
sexual solicitation or approach over the Internet in the past year; (2) that about 4% of
youth Internet users had received an "aggressive" sexual solicitation (a solicitor who
asked to meet them somewhere; called them on the telephone; or sent them regular
mail, money or gifts); (3) that 4% of youth Internet users were asked by online solici-
tors for nude or sexually explicit photographs of themselves; (4) that 34% of
youth Internet users had had unwanted exposure in the past year to pictures of naked
41 E.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMs; 2006
REPORT 3- (OJJDP 2006).
42 Juveniles Who Haze Sexually Offended 14-15 (OJJDP Mar. 2001).
-43 HORATIO ALGER Ass'N, THE STATE OF OUR NATION'S YOUTH 2008-2009, at 18 (2008
national survey, by Peter D. Hart Research Assocs.).
44 Virginia Kendall, The Lost Child: Congress's Inability to Protect Our Teenagers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
1 0', 130' (1998).
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people or people having sex; and (5) that 97( of youth Internet users had been threat-
ened or harassed. Many youth Internet users do not tell their parents or authorities
when they are victimized. Among youths targeted in 2007, "solicitations were
more commonly reported via instant messaging (43%) and in chat rooms (32%), and
harassment was more commonly reported in instant messaging (55%) than through
social networking sites (27% and 28%, respectively)," such as Facebook and
MySpace.46
To catch and prosecute persons who use the Internet to entice children into
sexual encounters, undercover police officers often pose as children in communications
with adults. Courts have upheld convictions for attempted child enticement and
similar sex crimes, even where the defendant sought to entice a non-existent "child"
because the target actually was a posing law enforcement officer._ Some states have
amended their criminal statutes to proscribe, not luring -a minor' by computer into
a sexual encounter, but luring "a person the adult believes to be a minor."" In the
usual circumstance in which the defendant initiates the contact and later pursues
the conversation and perhaps seeks to meet the child, courts also reject defendants'
efforts to establish a defense of entrapment, which occurs only when the govern-
ment "implant[s] in an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal
act, and then induce[s) commission of the crime so that the Government may
prosecute."
Federal Legislation
Most prosecutions of sex crimes against children (like most prosecutions generally)
occur in state courts, but Congress has also legislated to reach molesters who prey on
children face-to-face or through the Internet or other means of communication. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 makes it a crime to travel in interstate or foreign commerce
to engage in any of a wide range of sexual acts with a person under eighteen. The section
has been upheld against challenges that it exceeds Congress' commerce clause authority
or impermissibly burdens the fundamental right to interstate travel."' The defendant
similarly holds no First Amendment right to engage in speech that entices children to
engage in sexual activity."
45 Janis Wolak et al., Online Vitiization of Youth: Five Years Later 1-2, 57 (OJJDP 2006).
46 Michele L. Ybarra & Kimberly J. Mitchell, How Risky Are Social Networking Stre, 121 PEDI-
ATRICS 350 (2008).
47 1-g., United States v. Helder, 452 F3d 751 (8th Cir. 2006); Kirwan v. State, 96 S.W.3d 724
(Ark. 2003).
48 E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-05.1.
9 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U. 5 540, 548 (1992); see also, e.g., State v. Pischel, 762 N.W.2d
595 (Neb. 2009) (rejecting enticer's entrapment defense).
50 E.g., United States v. Hawkins, 513 E3d 59 (2d Cit. 2008) (commerce clause); United States v.
Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200 (5th Cit. 2003) (right to travel).
51 E.g., United States v. Dhingra, 3'1 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2004).
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The Contours of Criminal Liability
Gender Neutrality
Statutory rape laws typically now carry gender-neutral language, though most
statutory rape prosecutions still involve a male offender and an underage female victim. 2
Prosecution is also possible where the perpetrator and underage victim are of the same
gender.'
Mistake of Age
Most statutory rape and other sex crimes statutes establish strict liability offenses
(that is, offenses not requiring proof of a culpable mental state), even though strict
liability crimes are the exception in American law. Mistake of age is no defense, regard-
less of the victim's appearance, sexual sophistication, or verbal misrepresentations
about age, and regardless of the defendant's efforts to learn the victim's age. Legisla-
tures restrict or eliminate the mistake-of-age defense to protect victims and punish
wrongdoers, and to limit or eliminate the need for testimony by or concerning the
victim.
Only about a third of the states have statutes permitting a mistake-of-age defense
in some sex crime prosecutions. Some of these statutes permit the defense to crimes
charging sexual relations with older underage victims but not with younger victims.
Other states permit the defense for less serious sex crimes but not more serious ones.
Where a mistake-of-age defense is available, the defendant must prove the reasonableness
of his belief concerning the victim's age.
Emancipation or Marriage
If the victim unmarried to the defendant is below the age of consent, the sex crime
defendant may not avoid liability by establishing that the victim was emancipated.
Marriage, however, remains a defense for a spouse to most statutory rape and other
non-forcible sex crimes that impose liability based on the victim's age. The rationale is
that the law should not intrude on the marital relationship unless the defendant spouse
has resorted to force. The marital defense is unlikely to affect non-forcible sexual relations
with particularly young minors because such minors normally do not marry, even under
statutes permitting marriage with parental consent or court approval.
Child Perpetrators
"U Juveniles continue to constitute a substantial proportion-more than one-third
[35.6%}-of those who commit sexual offenses against minors."5 4 The number of such
52 Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 41, at 37.
53 E.g., State v. Buch, 926 P.2d 599 (Haw. 1996) (third-degree sexual assault).
54 David Finkelhor et al.,]uveniles Who Commit Sex Offenses Against Minors 1-2, 7 (OJJDP 2009).
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victimizations may be even higher, not only because of the general reluctance to report
sexual victimization, but also because many cases may be resolved by child protection
authorities or the schools without police involvement." This population of juvenile
offenders "includes older and younger youth, males and females, those who offend against
much younger children, those who offend against peers, those who offend alone, and
those who offend in groups."56
Most sex crime laws subject a defendant of any age, including a minor, to prosecu-
tion because they operate broadly against "any person," or against "whoever" engages in
the conduct. Virtually all courts have upheld prosecutions of a minor perpetrator, or of
both minor participants on the grounds that "each is the victim of the other" and each
needs the law's protection." Some statutory rape laws, however, permit prosecution of a
minor, but only where the difference in the ages of the perpetrator and the underage
victim is at least a specified minimum. 8
When the alleged perpetrator is a particularly young child, prosecutorial discretion
may raise delicate threshold concerns. The American Academy of Pediatrics, for example,
urges authorities to distinguish between "sexual abuse" and sexual play," based on
whether the sexual activity is marked by "a developmental asymmetry among the
participants" and by whether the behavior is coercive. "[Wihen young children at the
same developmental stage are looking at or touching each other's genitalia because of
mutual interest, without coercion or intrusion of the body, this is considered normal (i.e.,
nonabusive) behavior. However, a 6-year-old who tries to coerce a 3-year-old to engage in
anal intercourse is displaying abnormal behavior, and appropriate referrals should be
made to assess the origin of such behavior and to establish appropriate safety parameters
for all children involved."" "Children or adolescents who exhibit inappropriate or exces-
sive sexual behavior may be reacting to their own victimization or may live in environ-
ments with stressors, boundary problems, or family sexuality or nudity."6o
Proving the Case
General Difficulties of Proof
The Supreme Court acknowledges that child sexual abuse is "one of the most
difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim."61 Prosecutors may face obstacles to bringing charges in the first place,
and then to proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt consistent with the presumption of
innocence and other constitutional guarantees. Most sex crimes against children leave no
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id. at 8.
57 In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631 (Il. App. Ct. 1997).
58 E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (first-degree rape) (victim under thirteen and defendant at
least twelve and at least four years older than the victim).
59 Am. Academy of Pediatrics, The Evaluation of Sexual Abuse in Children, 116 PEDIATRICS 506
(2005).
60 Id.
61 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (198) (plurality opinion).
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physical or medical evidence to corroborate the charge. As Ritchie intimates, many sex
crimes are committed in private, leaving the child victim the only eyewitness. The
frightened or ashamed child may have delayed reporting the abuse, inviting suggestion
that he fabricated the charge or that the child's memory has dimmed with the passage of
time. The child may be an ineffective witness because she is scared, intimidated, less than
fully communicative, or perhaps reluctant or unwilling to help convict a family member
or other trusted person. The child may be unable to recall key events or may recant. The
family may not want the child to suffer further trauma of public testimony.
Circumstances may leave the prosecutor with little practical alternative but to try
to prove the case through expert testimony of physicians, psychiatrists, social workers or
psychologists. Where obstacles appear particularly imposing, the prosecutor may drop
charges altogether or accept a plea bargain that sharply reduces the sentence imposed on
a dangerous perpetrator.
In recent years, the law has fashioned evidentiary devices designed to elicit state-
ments from child victims in sex abuse prosecutions. The innovations, which are dis-
cussed in the next three sections, stem from the sense that children's reports of sexual
abuse are generally reliable because children would not persistently lie about sensitive
matters, and would not know details of sexual behavior necessary to sustain a lie for
very long. Some observers, however, maintain that an adult questioner (such as a
physician, child welfare agency employee, or police officer) can sometimes lead a
child to give answers the questioner wants to hear. Much scholarship and empirical
research discuss the suggestibility of child interviewees and reveal sharp disagreements
about the circumstances under which young sex abuse victims can or should be
believed.62
The evidentiary innovations designed to elicit the child victim's statements are
more available in civil maltreatment cases than in criminal prosecutions, which are
subject to the Supreme Court's new Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause restrictions
on the admission of hearsay testimony. The new restrictions, which the Supreme Court
announced in Crauford v Washington in 2004, are discussed below.63
The "General Child Hearsay " Exception
Children's out-of-court statements may be admissible under recognized hearsay
exceptions such as the ones for excited utterances or statements for medical diagnosis or
treatment.
Many states have also enacted "general child hearsay" exceptions, which permit
admission of a child sexual abuse victim's out-of-court statements that the court deems
trustworthy. In Missouri, for example, an otherwise inadmissible statement concerning a
sex crime made by a victim under twelve is admissible in a criminal proceeding as
substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if: "(1) The court finds, in
a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content and circum-
62 E.g., Thomas D. Lyon, The Neu Wave in Children's Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL
L. REv. 1004 (1999), which discusses much of the literature.
63 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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stances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2)(a) The child
testifies at the proceedings; or (b) The child is unavailable as a witness; or (c) The child
is otherwise physically available as a witness but the court finds that the significant
emotional or psychological trauma which would result from testifying in the personal
presence of the defendant makes the child unavailable as a witness at the time of the
criminal proceeding."6
Normally a declarant's mere absence from the trial does not establish the declarant's
unavailability. The party seeking to invoke a hearsay exception must also establish that
the declarant could not be present or testify because of death or then-existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity, or that the party could not procure the declarant's attendance
by process or other reasonable means. The Missouri statute quoted above, however,
illustrates the relaxed approach taken by the "general child hearsay" exception statutes.
The child's significant emotional or psychological trauma can render the child "unavail-
able" even if the child is sitting at home a mile away. The child's trustworthy hearsay
statement would be admissible, and the defendant would not have an opportunity to
cross-examine the child who could otherwise be produced.
The Victim's Ex Parte Videotaped Statement
A few states have enacted statutes permitting admission of a videotaped interview
of particularly young child sex abuse victims, without a showing that the child presently
suffers from significant emotional trauma and without contemporaneous cross-
examination. Kansas, for example, permits admission where the court finds that the
interview offers sufficient indicia of reliability, the person conducting the interview is
available to testify, the interview has not resulted from leading or suggestive questioning,
the recording equipment accurately recorded the interview, and the videotape has not
been altered or edited. Any later testimony by the child may be in person, or it may be
by videotape or closed-circuit television in accordance with the child witness protection
statute.65
State Child Witness Protection Statutes
The child victim's testimony may be more forceful than introduction of his or her
out-of-court statements. To protect child sex abuse victims from the trauma of testifying
in the physical presence of the defendant, most states have enacted statutes permitting
introduction of video monitor testimony of sexually abused children; about half of these
states authorize use of one-way closed-circuit video monitor testimony. A few states
authorize use of a two-way system that permits the child witness to see the courtroom and
the defendant on a video monitor and permits the jury and judge to view the child during
the testimony.
64 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.075.
65 Kan. Stat. § 22-3433(a).
15
16 1 JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JOURNAL Summer 2013
In 1Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court rejected a Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause challenge to child witness protection statutes.66 Craig concluded that the
Clause ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him") normally requires an actual face-to-face
meeting between the defendant and the witness appearing before the trier of fact, but that
the Clause's -preference" for face-to-face confrontation may yield where denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and where the testimo-
ny s reliability is otherwise assured." One such policy, according to Craig, is the need to
protect the physical and psychological well-being of child sex abuse victims from trauma
that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant. The Sixth
Amendment thus does not bar child witness protection statutes that, like the Maryland
statute under review, assure reliability by preserving three essential elements of confron-
tation: "The child witness must be competent to testify and must testify under oath; the
defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the
judge, jury, and defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and
body) of the witness as he or she testifies."
Craig held that even with these three essential elements preserved, the Sixth
Amendment permits an exception to face-to-face confrontation only where the trial court
also hears evidence and makes a case-specific finding (1) that the particular child witness
"would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the
defendant," and (2) that -the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the
presence of the defendant is more than de minimis. i.e., more than 'mere nervousness or
excitement or some reluctance to testify.' "-0
Most state child witness protection statutes apply not only to child victims who
testify in criminal sexual abuse proceedings, but also to child victims who testify in civil
abuse and neglect proceedings. In civil proceedings, the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause does not apply but procedure must satisfy due process.
Federal Child \Witness Protection
The Child Victims' and Child Witness' Protection Act of 1990 governs federal
court testimony of children under eighteen who are victims of physical, emotional, or
sexual abuse; children who are victims of child exploitation (child pornography or
child prostitution); or children who witness a crime against another person.' The Act
authorizes the court to permit these children to testify by two-way closed-circuit tele-
vision where expert testimony provides basis for a case-specific determination that the
prospective witness would suffer substantial fear or trauma and be unable to testify or
66 49 U.S. 836 (1990).
67 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
68 4-9 U.S. at 849 (italics deleted).
69 Id. at 851.
70 Id. at 856.
71 18 U.S.C. § 3509.
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communicate reasonably because of the defendant's physical presence, and not merely
because of a general fear of the courtroom.
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause: The Crawford Standard
In civil child maltreatment cases in the juvenile or family court, the evidentiary and
trial process devices discussed above remain applicable in accordance with due process
and the rules of evidence. In criminal child maltreatment prosecutions, however, admis-
sion of out-of-court statements (including those by the child victim) must comport with
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, which is quoted above.
In Crauford v. Washington in 2004, the Supreme Court established a new standard
for determining whether admission of hearsay testimony comports with the Confronta-
tion Clause.72 Before Crawford, admissibility of hearsay statements in criminal prosecu-
tions depended on whether the statement was "reliable'; under Crawford, admissibility
now depends on whether the proffered hearsay is "testimonial" or "non-testimonial."
Where an absent witness' statement is testimonial, the Confrontation Clause permits
admission only where two requirements-"unavailability and prior opportunity for
cross-examination"-are met.7 In a child maltreatment prosecution, the defendant's
prior opportunity need not necessarily come when the declarant made the statement, but
may come when the declarant testifies at a videotaped deposition or under another
substituted procedure." The defendant has had the requisite prior opportunity to cross-
examination even where the young witness is unresponsive or answers most questions
with "I don't know" or "I don't recall."
Crawford provided no "comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,' " but did say that
at a minimum," the term applies to "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."7 In 2006, the Court
explained that out-of-court statements (1) are non-testimonial "when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer-
gency,"' but (2) are testimonial "when the circumstances objectively indicate that there
is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."78 The
Court left open the question of "whether and when statements made to someone other
than law enforcement personnel are 'testimonial.' "
Lower courts have applied Crauford in several decisions reviewing convictions for
maltreating children who gave out-of-court statements. Child victims' statements to a
72 541 U.S 36 (2004).
73 Id. at 68.
74 State v. Griffin, 202 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
75 E.g., Pantano v, State, 1 38 P.3d 47 (Nev. 2006).
76 Crauwod, 541 U.S at 68.
77 Davis v. Washington, 54- U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
'8 Id. at 822.
79 Id. at 823.
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friend, co-worker, or non-government employee, without police involvement, have been
held non-testimonial and thus admissible."' Courts are likely to find child victims'
statements to their parents non-testimonial because of the intimate nature of the parent-
child relationship." In Pantano v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court explained the policy
considerations: "A parent questioning his or her child regarding possible sexual abuse is
inquiring into the health, safety, and well-being of the child. To characterize such
parental questioning as the gathering of evidence for purposes of litigation would
unnecessarily and undesirably militate against a parent's ability to support and nurture
a child at a time when the child most needs that support.""
Where a physician or other medical personnel interview the child strictly for
medical treatment purposes and not in anticipation of criminal proceedings, courts have
similarly held the child's out-of-court statements non-testimonial." Where a child
makes a statement as part of an investigation by government officials, however, courts
generally hold the statement testimonial because Crawtford stated that "[i1nvolvement of
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents
unique potential for prosecutorial abuse."8 4 The government officials' involvement, the
Court added, would often "lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial."" In particular, statements made by
child victims at children's shelters with police involvement have been held testimonial.
Craig's approval of child witness protection statutes has survived Crawford because
the earlier decision did not concern children's hearsay testimony, but rather children who
testified subject to cross-examination, though under a substituted procedure.8
The remainder of this section discusses other trial practice devices and accommoda-
tions designed to facilitate child sexual abuse testimony in civil and criminal cases alike.
Children's Competency to Testify
In recent years, concern about child sexual abuse has led states to relax rules
concerning child victims' competency to testify. Children under a particular age are
generally competent unless they are shown to lack capacity to recall facts correctly or to
testify truthfully. In many states, however, child sexual abuse victims of any age are com-
petent as a matter of law to testify about the abuse. Victims as young as three have testified.
80 E.g., People v. Griffin, 93 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2004) (12-year-old murder victim's statement to a
friend at school that the defendant stepfather had been fondling her for some time and she intended to
confront him); People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (two-year-old girl's statement to a
non-government employee of Children's Assessment Center about sexual assault by the defendant).
81 E.g., Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So.2d 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (three-year-old child's
statements to her mother and father reporting a touching).
82 138 P.3d 477, 483 (Nev. 2006).
83 E.g., State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004) (physician); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d
393 (Minn. Cr. App. 2005) (nurse practitioner).
84 Crautford, 541 U.S. at 56.
85 Id. at 52 (citation omitted).
86 E.g., State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005) (child sexual abuse victim's statement to child
protective services investigator).
87 E.g., State v. Henriod, 131 P.3d 232, 237 (Utah 2006).
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The Oath
Prospective witnesses, including children, must be sworn or affirmed before testi-
fying. With a young child witness, however, the oath need not take any particular form.
The New Jersey Supreme Court explains that "[any ceremony which obtains from [a
child] a commitment to comply with [the] obligation [to speak the truth in court]
on pain of future punishment of any kind constitutes an acceptable . . oath. It is
not necessary that an infant mouth the traditional litany nor comprehend its legal
significance.""
Manner of Examination
The child may hold an absolute right to have a parent present during testimony,
even if the parent would otherwise be subject to exclusion from the courtroom as a
potential future witness." Trial courts otherwise have considerable discretion to regulate
the manner in which child witnesses are examined.
For example, courts ordinarily permit young sex abuse victims to be accompanied
during testimony by parents, relatives, friends, guardians ad litem, clergy, or other
adults. In State v. Alidani, for example, the trial court permitted the victim-assistant to
sit beside the eight-year-old victim and hold her hand during her testimony.90 The South
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction because the record showed no indication
that the assistant spoke or acted in any way to influence the child's testimony.
The trial court may permit counsel, on direct examination, to ask leading questions
of a child sex abuse victim.91 Despite the trial court's leeway in regulating the child
witness' testimony, however, the court commits reversible error where the judge's behav-
ior amounts to vouching for the witness. In People v. Rogers, for example, the trial judge
committed reversible error by personally escorting the six-year-old sexual abuse victim to
and from the witness stand in front of the jury.92 In In reJ.G., however, the trial judge did
not commit fundamental error by thanking the six-year-old sex abuse witness for her
testimony as she left the witness stand: "You answered the questions just right. Thank
you. You can go."
Closing the Courtroom
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right to
a . public trial."9' The right is not absolute, however, and courts have long held
88 State v. G.C., 902 A.2d 1174, 1181 (N.J. 2006).
89 E.g., State v, Uriarte, 981 P.2d 575 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
90 609 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 2000).
91 E.g., United States v. Rojas, 520 F.3d 8'6 (8th Cit. 2008) (10-year-old victim); Bell v. State, 670
S.E.2d 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (14-year-old victim).
92 800 P.2d 1327 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
93 195 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
94 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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authority to exclude the public from sexual assault trials, particularly ones involving
child victims."
The public also holds a constitutional right to open criminal trials. Where the
objection to a closure order comes from the media or other members of the public rather
than from the defendant, however, the objection implicates the First Amendment rather
than the Sixth Amendment. In Globe Neuspaper Co. i. Superior Court, the Supreme Court
struck down a state statute that mandated exclusion of the press and the general public
during testimony of minor victims of specified sexual offenses.96 Globe Nuewspaper Co.
found a compelling state interest in protecting child sex crime victims, but nonetheless
held that mandatory exclusion violated the media plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.
The Court held that "[in individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the First
Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from the courtroom of the
press and general public during the testimony of minor sex-offense victims."' The trial
court, however, must determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to
protect the victim. Among the factors to be weighed are the victim's age, psychological
maturity and understanding; the nature of the crime; the victim's desires; and the
interests of parents and relatives.9 8
The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
Through shame or fear, children frequently delay reporting sexual abuse, even to
members of their immediate family. Delay invites the defendant to claim that the child
fabricated the story or suffers from memory lapse. The Child Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome offers explanations about why a sexually abused child would accept the abuse
or delay reporting it, behavior some adults might find unusual or even inconceivable.99
The Syndrome includes five behaviors most commonly observed in child sex abuse
victims:
Secrecy. Because much sexual abuse happens only when the child is alone with the offending
adult who often threatens her with injury to herself or her family if she discloses, the child
gets the impression of danger and fearful outcome.
Helplessness. Because the child is in a subordinate role, totally dependent on the adult, her
normal reaction is to "play possum."
Entrapment and accommodation. Because of the child's helplessness, the only healthy option is
to survive by accepting the situation.
Delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure. Most child victims never disclose the sexual
abuse, at least not outside the immediate family. Disclosure may occur only after some years
have passed and accommodation mechanisms break down.
Retraction. "Whatever a child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it."too
95 Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1913).
96 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
97 Id. at 611 n. 2
98 Id. at 608.
99 E.g., State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1993).
100 Id. at 1204-05.
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When expert testimony is based on interviews with the child, most authorities
consider the Syndrome's underlying theory and science valid as diagnostic tools to
explain the child's seemingly unusual reactions to sexual abuse. But these authorities also
recognize that behaviors characteristic of the Syndrome may also characterize children's
reactions to disorders that have nothing to do with sexual abuse, such as poverty or
psychological abuse.
Syndrome testimony has divided the courts that have ruled on its admissibility.
Most decisions hold that the prosecutor may not use expert testimony concerning the
Syndrome in the case-in-chief as substantive evidence that abuse occurred, and that the
Syndrome may be introduced only to rehabilitate the child's credibility by explaining his
or her coping mechanisms. A few decisions hold Syndrome testimony inadmissible either
as substantive evidence or to rehabilitate.""
Prospective Restraints on the Offender
Civil Commitment
Prosecutors concerned with forcing the child sexual abuse victim to relive the
trauma at trial may decide not to charge the alleged perpetrator, or else may decide to
accept a plea bargain. Following a plea bargain, a dangerous defendant may return to the
streets considerably sooner than if sentencing had followed trial and conviction. On the
other hand, many sex offenders are not recidivists. In an effort to protect future victims
while enabling non-dangerous offenders to reintegrate themselves peaceably into the
community after serving their sentences, states have enacted civil commitment statutes.
These statutes authorize the court, after a hearing, to order commitment or other
mandatory treatment of sexual offenders determined to be mentally abnormal and sexu-
ally dangerous when their criminal sentences expire.
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court upheld that state's Sexually Violent
Predator Act, which established procedures for civil commitment of persons who, due to
a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder," the court finds likely to engage in
future "predatory acts of sexual violence."102 The Act applied to persons presently
confined and scheduled for release, persons charged with a "sexually violent offense" but
found incompetent to stand trial, and persons found not guilty by reason of insanity or
because of a mental disease or defect.
Registration and Cowmunity Notification
On July 29, 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was abducted, raped, and mur-
dered by a neighbor who lived across the street from her family in suburban New Jersey.
The confessed murderer had enticed the child into his home with a promise to see his new
puppy, then strangled her with a belt, covered her head with plastic bags, raped her as she
101 Abrams & Ramsey, supra note 21, at 587-88.
102 521 U.S. 3-16, 350 (1997).
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lay unconscious, and left her body in a nearby park. Megan, her parents, local police, and
other members of the community were unaware that the murderer had twice been
convicted of sex offenses against young girls, and that he shared his house with two other
men also previously convicted of sex crimes.
New Jersey responded swiftly to intense public reaction to Megan's murder by
enacting the Registration and Community Notification Laws, collectively called
"Megan's Law, within three months. The laws (1) required persons who had committed
designated crimes involving sexual assault to register their addresses with local law
enforcement authorities, and (2) provided for dissemination to the community of infor-
mation about registrants deemed to pose continuing danger to public safety.
Within a year, most other states enacted their own versions of Megan's Law, plus a
variety of related child-protective measures. Many states, for example, prohibit released
sex offenders from living near or visiting schools, playgrounds, and other places where
children typically gather. o Some courts have imposed such prohibitions as conditions of
probation or community supervision."1 04
In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, which required a state to create a sex offender
registration program as a condition for receiving a percentage of federal crime prevention
and interdiction funds."' The Act mandated registration for ten years of persons con-
victed of sex crimes against minors or violent sex crimes. The Act permitted, but did not
mandate, community notification provisions. When it became apparent that only a few
states would mandate notification, Congress amended the Wetterling Act in 1996 to
mandate that states also enact community notification provisions as a condition for
receiving their full share of federal funds.o 6
The 1996 legislation also established a national sex offender registry, maintained by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.111 The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
of 2006 instructs the U.S. Justice Department to maintain an integrated national
Internet sex offender registry available to the public and searchable by ZIP Code and
provides minimum nationwide federal standards for sex offender registration and noti-
fication."os A convicted sex offender who fails to register in person with local authorities,
provide DNA samples, and then regularly update information commits a federal felony.
The 2006 legislation requires states to list all sex offenders and provide their photo-
graphs, descriptions, employment, and other specified information. Most states have
resisted implementing the national federal registry because of opposition to lifetime
registration for juvenile sex offenders, concerns for burdens imposed on existing state
criminal codes, and the costs of compliance. 09
103 E.g., State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005).
104 E.g., Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
105 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
106 Id. § 14071(d).
107 Id. § 14071.
108 P.L. 109-248.
109 Maggie Clark, States Still Resisting National Sex Offender Lau Requirements, http://www.pewstates
.org/projects/stateline/headlines/states-still-resisting-national-sex-offender-law-85899420374 (Oct. 1,
2012).
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Where registration or public notification turns on whether the sex offender poses a
continuing threat to children or other persons in the community, the offender has a
constitutional right to an opportunity for a pre-notification hearing to determine that
fact." 0 In Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety v. Doe, however, the Supreme Court held that
due process does not require a hearing concerning the offender s current dangerousness
where the state act bases the registration requirement only on the prior conviction, and
not on current dangerousness."'
Megan's Laws vary considerably in their application to juvenile perpetrators. Most
states permit or require registration by adjudicated juveniles, and a few states specifically
exclude juvenile perpetrators. In the states that permit or require juvenile registration,
most limit registration to juvenile perpetrators who were above a minimum age at the
time of the offense, ranging from seven in Massachusetts to fifteen in South Dakota." 2
Most of these states also impose the possibility of lifetime registration, though some
states set a maximum age or time limit after which a court may lift the requirement."'
Covered juvenile perpetrators may range from ones who commit forcible rape to
B.G., a 12-year-old delinquent adjudicated for reportedly groping his eight-year-old
stepbrother while they were in the bathtub."' Megan's Laws thus may impose a whole-
sale "one size fits all" standard designed for predatory adults, an outcome that has caused
some courts considerable discomfort." 5
Child Pornography
Neu York v. Ferber (1982)
Production and dissemination of child pornography-"depictions of sexual activity
involving children"" 6'are forms of child sexual abuse. The seminal Supreme Court
decision is New York v. Ferber, which upheld the conviction of the owner of an "adult"
bookstore who sold an undercover police officer two films devoted almost exclusively to
depicting young boys masturbating. The New York statute prohibited persons from
knowingly promoting sexual performances of children under sixteen by distributing
material that depicted such performances. The statute operated even where the sexual
performance was not legally obscene.
Ferber held that child pornography, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First
Amendment. The Court acknowledged that the Amendment protects depictions of
110 E.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
111 538 LU.S. 1 (2003).
112 Linda A. Szymanski, Megan's Law: Juvende Sex Offender Lower Age Limits (2009 Update), at I
(Nat'l Center for Juv. Just. 2009).
113 Linda A. Szymanski, Megan's Law: Termination of Registration Requirement (2009 Update), at I
(Nat'1 Center for Juv. Just. 2009).
114 In re B.G., 674 A.2d 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
115 E.g., In re J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding statutory requirement
that 11-year-old offender register for lifetime, but urging the legislature to "review the prudence of requiring
all juveniles adjudicated for criminal sexual conduct to register as predatory sexual offenders").
116 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 74', '53 (1982).
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non-obscene sexual activity between adults, but granted states "greater leeway" in
regulating child pornography because of its effect on the child performers themselves,
without regard for its effect on viewers."
Ferber concluded (1) that "the exploitative use of children in the production of
pornography has become a serious national problem,""' (2) that states have a compelling
interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor""' and in
"{the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children,"u 0 and (3) that "the use of
children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional
and mental health of the child""' because "the materials produced are a permanent record
of the children's participation." 12
Ferber in the Computer Age
Ferber, decided before the age of computer-generated images, defined child pornog-
raphy to concern "the exploitative use of children." 12  The decision removed child
pornography from First Amendment protection because of its present and future harmful
effects on actual child performers, without discussing any effect that child pornography
might have on viewers. Without deciding the question, Ferber said in passing that "the
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene,
which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of
live performances, retains First Amendment protection.124
By the last decade of the twentieth century, "virtual" child pornography had become
a pressing issue. Computers can now manipulate, or "morph," an innocent picture of an
actual child to create a picture showing the child engaged in sexual activity. An obscene or
non-obscene picture of an adult can be transformed into the image of a nonexistent child.
Computer graphics can even generate the realistic image of a nonexistent child.
In the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Congress responded to techno-
logical advances by criminalizing non-obscene virtual child pornography.125 The law-
makers based the Act squarely on virtual child pornography's effect on viewers. The
lawmakers found that pedophiles might use virtual images to encourage children to
participate in sexual activity, and that pedophiles might also whet their own sexual
appetites with the pornographic images. Congress also found that the existence of
computer-generated images can complicate prosecutions of pornographers who do use
real children by making it more difficult to prove that a particular picture was produced
using actual children.
117 Id. at 756.
118 Id. at 749.
119 Id. at 756-57 (citation omitted).
120 Id. at 757.
121 Id. at 758.
122 Id. at 759.
123 Id. at 749.
124 Id. at 764-65.
125 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
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In Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the
1996 Act relating to materials that appear to depict minors but are produced without using
real children.'2 6 The plaintiffs did not challenge the provision criminalizing morphing,
which (like the materials at issue in Ferber) implicates the interests of real children. Ashcroft
also left undisturbed the provision criminalizing child pornography using actual children,
Ferber's target. But Ashcroft held that the provisions relating to nonexistent children
violated the First Amendment for prohibiting speech that records no crime and creates no
victims by its production."'2 The Court found any causal link between virtual images and
actual incidents of child abuse only "contingent and indirect."' 2 1
Ashcroft's conferral of First Amendment protection carried substantial risks as
virtual child pornography became more brutal, more graphic, and more available on the
Internet than ever before. The greater availability threatened children's safety because,
according to one former FBI agent, "All virtual porn does is satisfy [pedophiles} until
they can find their next victim. It feeds their addiction." 29 Most important, Ashcroft
indeed seriously impeded child pornography prosecutions because, as Congress predicted
in the 1996 legislation, "[the emergence of new technology and the repeated retrans-
mission of picture files over the Internet could make it nearly impossible to prove that a
particular image was produced using real children."' 30
With the genuine prospect that child pornography prosecutions would grind to a
halt, the Court strengthened prosecutors' hands in 2008. In United States r. Wiliams, the
Court upheld the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003. 1 The Act's "pandering and solicitation"
provision prohibits advertisement, distribution, and solicitation of child pornography
where the speaker believes, or intends the listener to believe, that the subject of the
proposed transaction depicts real children. The prohibition applies even where the
materials do not exist or do not portray actual children. By holding that "offers to provide
or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from the First Amend-
ment,"l32 Williams permits effective regulation of transactions in the underlying materials
without regard to their content.
Child Nudity
Ferber concerned a statute that prohibited distribution of photographs and films
depicting "sexual activity" by juveniles. In recent years, a number of commercial pho-
tographers have used nude and partially nude children in photo essays displayed in public
exhibitions or published in books.
126 535 U.S 234 (2002).
127 Id. at 250.
128 Id.
129 Chris Francescani & Christel Kucharz, Virtual Child Porn Riles Law Enforcement, http://
abcnews.go.com/printid=3159871 (May 10, 2007).
130 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
131 Id.; 117 Stat. 650.
132 IVlliams, 553 U.S. at 299.
26 JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTJOURNAL / SuLmmer 201 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether photographs and films of nude or
partially nude children, without sexual activity, constitute punishable child pornography
or First Amendment-protected expression. In a footnote, Ferber stated that "nudity,
without more is protected expression," but the Court was not reviewing a statute that
presented the nudity issue.' In the absence of Supreme Court resolution, most lower
courts have regarded photographs and films of nude children, without more, as First
Amendment-protected expression, but have upheld convictions under statutes that pro-
hibit such depictions made for sexual gratification. As thus limited, the depictions
become child pornography proscribable under Ferber
Private Po.uesion and Viewing of Child Pornography
In Osborne i. Ohio, the Court upheld a statute that prohibited private possession and
viewing of non-obscene child pornography (including private possession and viewing in
one's own home), even without proof that the possessor intended to distribute the
material.13 The Court found that because 'much of the child pornography market has
been driven underground" since Fr/er, "it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the
child pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution."'35
Federal Legislation
Neither Congress nor the states legislated against child pornography until the
1970s. Based on findings that the "highly organized, multi-million dollar" underground
child pornography industry was interstate and international in scope,' " the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 added two substantive sections to the
federal criminal code. The first section, now 18 U.S.C. § 2251, prohibits the use of
children in "sexually explicit" productions, and prohibits parents and guardians from
allowing such use of their children. The second section, now 18 U.S.C. § 2252, makes it
a federal crime to transport, ship or receive in interstate commerce for the purpose of
selling, any "obscene visual or print medium" if its production involved the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Because the 1977 Act required proof that the materials were obscene and that the
defendant had a profit motive, the Act yielded only a handful of prosecutions in its first
five years of operation. Relying on Ferber, the Child Protection Act of 1984 prohibited
distribution of non-obscene material depicting sexual activity by children and eliminated
the "pecuniary profit" element. The 1984 Act also legislated against possession by
criminalizing the receipt in interstate or foreign commerce of materials showing minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Congressional legislation has continued. In 1986, for example, the lawmakers
prohibited production and use of advertisements for child pornography and created a
133 Ferber, 458 U S. at 765 n.10.
13-4 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
135 Id. at 110.
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private civil remedy in favor of persons who suffer personal injury resulting from the
production of child pornography.'" The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 is
discussed above ("Ferber in the Computer Age").
**Se xting/,
Growing numbers of teens are taking nude, semi-nude, or other sexually explicit
photos of themselves and then sending the photos to friends electronically. About 20,7
of teens acknowledge participating in this so-called "sexting." Most of the participating
teens (691X) send the photos to their boyfriends or girlfriends, or someone they would like
to date (30o)."' Once sent, the photos may be distributed widely by cell phones, the
Internet, and other electronic means.
Some prosecutors have moved against sexting under laws criminalizing production,
distribution, or possession of child pornography. A delinquency adjudication or criminal
conviction arising from sexting might obligate a teen to register as a sex offender, perhaps
for life. When a 14-year-old girl was arrested for posting nude photos of herself online,
however, Maureen Kanka (the mother of Megan, whose 1994 murder spurred registration
and notification statutes) said that "This shouldn't fall under Megan's Law in any way,
shape or form. She should have an intervention and counseling, because the only person
she exploited was herself."1 9
137 18 U.S.C. §§ 25 1(c), 2255.
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139 Assoc. Press, Girl Posts \Iad Pics. h Charged \fith Kid Porn (Mar 27, 2009), http://
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